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Eleftherios Anastasiadis ∗ Argyrios Deligkas †
Abstract
We study heterogeneous k-facility location games. In this model there are k facilities where each
facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary
arbitrarily. Our goal is to design strategy proof mechanisms that place the facilities in a way to
maximize the minimum utility among the agents. For k = 1, if the agents’ locations are known,
we prove that the mechanism that places the facility on an optimal location is strategy proof. For
k ≥ 2, we prove that there is no optimal strategy proof mechanism, deterministic or randomized,
even when k = 2 there are only two agents with known locations, and the facilities have to be placed
on a line segment. We derive inapproximability bounds for deterministic and randomized strategy
proof mechanisms. Finally, we focus on the line segment and provide strategy proof mechanisms
that achieve constant approximation. All of our mechanisms are simple and communication efficient.
As a byproduct we show that some of our mechanisms can be used to achieve constant factor
approximations for other objectives as the social welfare and the happiness.
1 Introduction
Facility location games lie in the intersection of AI, game theory, and social choice theory and have
been studied extensively over the past years. The basic version of the problem was firstly studied
by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [29]. In this setting, a central planner has to locate a facility on a real
line based on the reported locations of selfish agents who want to be as close as possible to the facility.
The goal of the planner is to locate the facility in a way that the sum of the utilities of the agents is
maximized. 1 However, the agents can misreport their locations in order to manipulate the planner and
increase their utility. One main objective of the planner is to design procedures to locate the facility,
called mechanisms, that incentivize the agents to report their true locations, i.e., the mechanisms are
strategy proof.
When monetary payments are not allowed, that is the planner cannot pay the agents or demand
payments from them, it is not always possible to design mechanisms that implement an optimal solution
and remain strategy-proof. Thus, the goal is to design mechanisms that approximately maximize an
objective function under the constraint that they are strategy proof. The term approximate mechanism
design without money, introduced by Procaccia and Tennenholtz, is usually deployed for problems like
the one described above. Procaccia and Tennenholtz studied homogeneous facility location games, where
one, or two, identical facilities had to be placed on a real line and every agent wanted to be as close as
possible to any of them. In this setting, the agents were reporting to the planner a point on the line and
the objectives studied were the maximization of the social welfare or the minimum utility among the
agents.
In many real-life scenarios though, both facilities and the preferences of the agents are heterogeneous ;
every facility serves a different need and every agent has potentially different needs from the others.
Consider for example the case where the government is planning to build a school and a factory. Citizens’
preferences for these facilities might significantly differentiate. Those who work at the factory and also
have children that go to school wish both facilities to be built close to their homes. Citizens without
children might want the school to be built far because of the noise. Finally, those who do not work at
the factory prefer its location to be far from their home to avoid emitted pollution.
The example above shows that an agent might want to be close to a facility, be away from a facility,
or be indifferent about its presence. Feigenbaum and Sethuraman [10] studied 1-facility heterogeneous
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games where each agent reported his preferred location on the line, while it was known to the planner,
whether he wanted to be close to, or away from, the facility. Zou and Li [36] extended the model of [10]
for heterogeneous 2-facility games and studied the social utility objective for several different scenarios
of the information the planner knows. Serafino and Ventre [30] studied heterogeneous 2-facility games
on discrete networks. In their setting, each agent is located on a node of a graph and either is indifferent
or wants to be close to each facility and the planner knows the location of every agent but not their
preferences for the facilities.
In this paper, we extend the aforementioned models and study heterogeneous k-facility location games;
simply k-facility games. Our main focus is to maximize the minimum utility among all the agents, termed
Egalitarian. As a byproduct, we derive results for the social welfare, termed Utilitarian, and the
recently proposed minimum happiness objective, termed Happiness. Happiness, which is reminiscent
of the proportionality notion in resource allocation problems, is a fairness criterion for facility location
problems introduced in [26]. The happiness of an agent is the ratio between the utility he gets under
the locations of the facilities over the maximum utility the agent could get under any location. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no prior work on this model. We note that while our model is a natural
extension of the aforementioned models almost none of those results apply in our case.
1.1 Our contributions
We study several questions regarding heterogeneous k-facility games. Firstly, we focus on the case
where there is only one facility to be located. Feigenbaum and Sethuraman [10] have proven that there
is no deterministic strategy-proof mechanism with bounded approximation for Egalitarian for this
case where the preferences of the agents are known and their locations are unknown. We study the
complementary case where the locations are known and the preferences are not known to the planner.
We prove that in this case the mechanism that places the facility on an optimal location for the reported
preferences of the agents is strategy-proof. In fact, our result is much stronger since it holds for any
combination of the following relaxations.
• The utility function of every agent can be any function that it is monotone with respect the distance
between the location of the agent and the location of the facility. Thus, if an agent wants to be
close to the facility, his utility decreases with the distance, and if he wants to be away from the
facility, his utility increases.
• The domain Di of every agent’s possible locations and the domain F of allowed locations for the
facility can be any subset of Rd. In addition, it can be the case that F ∩Di = ∅ for every agent i.
Next, we focus on the Egalitarian objective. We prove that there is no optimal deterministic
strategy proof or strategy proof in expectation mechanism for k-facility games even for instances with
k = 2, two agents, and known locations for the agents. We complement these results by deriving
inapproximability bounds for deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms. The techniques
we use are fundamentally different from [30], since in our model, the facilities can be located anywhere
on the segment without any constraint, making the analysis more complex.
Then, we focus on 2-facility games and we propose strategy-proof mechanisms that achieve constant
approximation ratio for the Egalitarian objective. All of our mechanisms are simple (i.e. if it requires
minimal information from the agents (bit-wise)) and require limited communication. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to study the communication complexity on facility location problems
and how communication affects approximation. We propose two deterministic and two randomized
mechanisms. The first deterministic mechanism, called Fixed, requires zero communication between
the planner and the agents. On any instance, Fixed locates the facilities symmetrically away from the
middle of the segment without requiring any information from the agents. Although this mechanism
might seem naive, it achieves constant approximation. Furthermore, we prove that Fixed is optimal
when no communication is allowed. No communication means that the agents do not transmit any
bits to the planner before the locations for the facilities are decided, or equivalently that the facilities
have to be located without getting any information from the agents. The second mechanism, termed
Fixed
+, utilizes the intuition gained from Fixed and chooses between five different location-combinations
for the facilities and locates the facilities in one of them by using the information it got from the
agents. Furthermore, every agent has to communicate only 5 bits of information to the agent. Our first
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randomized mechanism, termed Random, places with half probability both facilities on the beginning of
the segment and with half probability both facilities on the end of the segment. Random seems naive,
but it achieves 12 -approximation, it is universally strategy-proof and requires zero communication. The
second randomized mechanism, Random+, combines the ideas of Random and Fixed+, it is strategy-proof
in expectation and improves upon Random by requiring again only 5 bits of information per agent.
For the special case where agents’ locations are known to the mechanism and all the agents are
indifferent or want to be close to the facilities, we show how we can utilize the optimal mechanism for
the 1-facility game and get a 34 -approximate strategy-proof mechanism for Egalitarian when k = 2.
As a byproduct, we show that Fixed and Random achieve the same approximation guarantee for Hap-
piness and Utilitarian. Thus, we establish lower bounds that were not known before and complement
the results of [36].
1.2 Further related work
There is a long line of work on homogeneous facility location games [1, 8, 16, 17, 22, 25, 24, 27, 35].
Different objectives and different utility functions have been studied as well. In [11] the objective was
the sum of Lp norms of agent’s utilities, while in [12] it was the sum of least squares. [15] introduced
double-peaked utility functions. The obnoxious facility game on the line, where every agent wants to be
away from the facilities, was introduced in [6] and later the model was extended for trees and cycles in [7].
In [33], the objective of least squares for obnoxious agents, was studied. The maximum envy was recently
introduced as an objective for facility location games in [5]. In that paper as well as in [18], the authors
studied the approximation of mechanisms according to additive errors. False-name proof mechanisms for
the location of two identical facilities were studied in [31] while [32] gave a characterization of strategy-
proof and group strategy-proof mechanisms in metric networks for 1-facility games with private locations
of the agents. Since the conference version of this paper [2], three other papers on heterogeneous facility
location games have appeared. In [9], the authors studied heterogeneous 2-facility games on a line
segment, under the extra constraint where the locations between the two facilities have to be at least
a certain distance. In [21], the authors studied heterogeneous facility location games where the agents
were located on a line but the facility could be placed in a region on the plane.
Simple mechanisms received a lot of attention lately; see [19] for example and the references therein for
simple auctions. Informally, a simple mechanism is easy to implement and allows the agents to “easily”
deduce the strategy proofness of the mechanism. One way to capture simplicity is to use verifiably
truthful mechanisms [4], where agents can check whether a mechanism is strategy-proof by using some,
possibly exponential, algorithm. Simple mechanisms were formalized in [23] by introducing obviously
strategy-proof mechanisms. [14] analysed this type of mechanisms for homogeneous 1-facility games.
After a long history in theoretical computer science [20], communication complexity problems have
been studied in auction settings [3] and in facility location games [13] but with ordinal preferences of
the agents as input to the mechanisms. Communication complexity has also been studied in other
more general mechanism design problems [28, 34]. To the best of our knowledge, no one studied the
communication complexity of facility location games on the line with cardinal utilities.
2 Model
In a k-facility game, there is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents located in Rd and a set of k distinct facilities
F = {1, . . . , k} that need to be placed in S ⊆ Rd. Each agent i is associated with a location xi ∈ Rd and
a vector ti ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k that represents his preferences for the facilities.
If agent i wants to be far from facility j, then tij = −1; if he is indifferent, then tij = 0; if he wants
to be close to j, then tij = 1. We will use y = (y1, . . . ,yk) to denote the locations of the facilities and
s = (s1, . . . , sn) to denote the profile of the agents, i.e. their declared tuples si = (xi, ti), ∀i ∈ N . A
vector s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) is the vector of tuples excluding si, thus we can denote a profile
as (si, s−i).
The utility that agent i gets from facility j, denoted as uij(xi, ti,y), depends on the distance
dist(xi,yj) between the location of the agent and the location of the facility j, and on the agent’s
preference tij for that facility. We assume that uij follows the rules below:
• If tij = −1, then uij(xi, ti,y) is strictly increasing with dist(xi,yj).
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• If tij = 0, then uij(xi, ti,y) is a constant independent of dist(xi,yj).
• If tij = 1, then uij(xi, ti,y) is strictly decreasing with dist(xi,yj).
The total utility agent i gets under y is defined as the sum of the utilities he gets for each of the facilities,
i.e. ui(xi, ti,y) =
∑
j∈[k] uij(xi, ti,yj). We consider three different objective functions: Egalitarian,
defined as maxy mini ui(xi, ti,y); Utilitarian defined as maxy
∑
i ui(xi, ti,y); and Happiness defined
as maxy mini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗
i
(xi,ti)
where u∗i (xi, ti) = maxy ui(xi, ti,y).
A mechanism M is an algorithm that takes as input a profile s and outputs the locations of the
facilities, y. A mechanism is deterministic if it chooses y deterministically and it is randomized if y
is chosen according to a probability distribution. Let OPT(s) and M(s) denote the optimal value and
the value of mechanism M for an objective function under the profile s respectively. A mechanism M
achieves an approximation ratio α ≤ 1, or it is α-approximate, if for any type profile s, it holds that
M(s) ≥ α · OPT(s). A mechanism is called strategy-proof if no agent can benefit by misreporting
his preferences. Formally, a mechanism M is strategy-proof if for any true profile (si, s−i) it returns
locations y and any misreported profile (s′i, s−i) it returns y
′, we have that ui(xi, ti,y) ≥ ui(xi, ti,y′). A
randomized mechanism is universally strategy proof if it is a probability distribution over deterministic
strategy proof mechanisms and strategy proof in expectation if no agent can increase his expected utility
by misreporting his type. Furthermore, a mechanism is called false-name proof if no agent can benefit
by using multiple and different identities in the game.
2.1 Facility location on a line segment
A special case of k-facility games is when all the agents are located on the line segment [0, ℓ], where
ℓ > 0. This case is extensively studied in the literature [29, 30] since the definitions above are greatly
simplified. For normalization purposes we assume that the maximum utility an agent can get from any
facility is ℓ and we define the utility function of agent i as follows.
uij(xi, ti,yj) =


|xi − yj |, if tij = −1
ℓ, if tij = 0
ℓ− |xi − yj |, if tij = 1.
(1)
3 1-facility games with known locations
We first study the case where the locations of the agents are publicly known and only one facility has to
be placed. We will show that the mechanism which places the facility on an optimal location using any
declaration-independent tie-breaking rule is strategy-proof for Egalitarian, Utilitarian, Happiness
objectives.
Definition 1. A mechanism M has a declaration-independent tie-breaking rule if it outputs the same y
for any two profiles s 6= s′ with M(s) = M(s′).
Hence, a mechanism has a declaration-independent tie-breaking rule if it outputs the same location
for the facility for all profiles that yield the same value for the objective we are trying to optimise. An
example of such a rule is the lexicographic minimum.
Mechanism 1: 1-facility-O-opt
In: For every agent i: public location xi ∈ Rd, private preference ti ∈ {−1, 0, 1}; region S ⊆ Rd;
objective O; declaration-independent tie-breaking rule T .
Out: Location y∗ ∈ S for the facility.
1. Let Y ⊆ S such that every y ∈ Y optimizes O for the given locations and preferences,
excluding the agents with preference 0.
2. Choose y∗ ∈ Y according to the tie-breaking rule T .
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Mechanism 1 does not make any assumptions about the dimensions of the agents locations and the
region S. So, the actual locations of the agents can be in Rd1 and the region S ⊆ Rd2 , where d1 6= d2.
In addition, S can be of an arbitrary form, i.e. it can be the union of several disjoint regions of Rd.
3.1 Analysis for Egalitarian objective
In this section we focus on the Egalitarian objective, i.e. O = maxy mini ui(xi, ti, y). In order to prove
that Mechanism 1 is strategy-proof for Egalitarian, we partition the agents into two sets Tl and Th.
Tl contains the agents with the minimum utility when the facility is placed on y∗ and Th = N \ Tl. Since
agents with preference type 0 have constant utility independently of y and they are excluded from the
computation of y, in our analysis we will assume that there is no agent i with ti = 0. We first prove
that no agent from the set Th has an incentive to lie.
Lemma 1. No agent from Th can increase his utility by lying.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that an agent i ∈ Th with preference ti declares preference
t′i and increases his utility. Let y
′ be the optimal location of the facility in this case. Since we have
assumed that agent i increases his payoff, we have that ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′). We will consider two
cases depending on the declaration t′i.
• t′i = 0. Recall, in this case, Mechanism 1 excludes agent i from the computation of y
′. Since
ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′), we get that y∗ 6= y′. In addition, we get that minj 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y′) >
minj 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y∗); if this was not the case, the mechanism could return y∗ and increase the value
of the objective. Hence, we get that minj uj(xj , tj ,y
′) > minj uj(xj , tj ,y∗). This means that y′ is
a better solution than y∗ for the Egalitarian objective, which contradicts the assumption that
y∗ is an optimal solution.
• t′i 6= 0. The utility of agent i will change only if the location of the facility changes; this is
due to the declaration-independent tie-breaking rule T . This will happen only if ui(xi, t
′
i,y
∗) <
minj 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y∗). This means that ui(xi, t′i,y
∗) < ui(xi, t′i,y
′). Without loss of generality let
t′i = 1. In this case dist(xi,y
∗) > dist(xi,y′), i.e. the new optimal location is closer to xi. But
this means that ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′) and since ti = −1 this contradicts the assumption that
agent i can increase his utility by misreporting his preference.
Next we prove that no agent from Tl has an incentive to lie about his preferences.
Lemma 2. No agent from Tl can increase his utility by lying.
Proof. We will prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that an agent i ∈ Tl with preference ti can
increase his utility by declaring t′i. Using exactly the same arguments as in Lemma 1 we can see that
t′i 6= 0. Let y
′ 6= y∗ be the optimal location for the facility when agent i declares t′i. Clearly, if y
′ = y∗
agent i has no reason to lie. We now consider the following two cases:
• ui(xi, t′i,y
∗) ≥ ui(xi, ti,y∗). Since we have assumed that agent i increases his utility by declaring
t′i, we have that ui(xi, ti,y
′) > ui(xi, ti,y∗). Hence, minj 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y′) > minj 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y∗)
since an agent j 6= i who now has the minimum utility is the one who determines the new outcome
y′. We note that minj∈N uj(xj , tj ,y′) should be strictly larger than minj∈N uj(xj , tj ,y∗) since
Mechanism 1 uses a declaration-independent tie-breaking rule. So the location should not change
if the value of the objective remains the same. But then we have that minj∈N uj(xj , tj ,y′) >
minj∈N uj(xj , tj,y∗) which contradicts the fact that y∗ is an optimal location for the facility.
• ui(xi, t′i,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y∗). This means that agent i under the declaration t′i has the smallest
utility over all the agents. Hence, one of the following cases must be true since we assumed that
t′i 6= 0. The first one is when ti = −1 and t
′
i = 1. Since the utility of agent i under the declaration
t′i increased, it means that dist(xi,y
′) < dist(xi,y∗), i.e. the facility must be placed closer to
his location xi. But this means that his utility under the true preference ti decreased because the
agent wants to be away from the facility. Similarly when ti = 1 and t
′
i = −1 the facility must be
placed further away from the position of the agent, while the agent wants to be close to the facility.
Hence, in both cases the utility of agent i decreases.
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As a result, in every case agent i cannot increase his utility by lying which contradicts our assumption.
Notice that Mechanism 1 places the facility on the location that maximizes our objective, i.e. it is
optimal. Furthermore, the combination of Lemmas 1 and 2 shows that no agent can increase his utility
by lying. The next theorem follows:
Theorem 1. Mechanism 1 is an optimal strategy-proof for the Egalitarian objective.
Theorem 1 complements in a sense the result of [10], where it was proven that there is no deterministic
strategy-proof mechanism with bounded approximation for the Egalitarian objective for 1-facility
games even on a line segments with known preferences but unknown locations.
3.2 Analysis for the Utilitarian objective
In this section we focus on the Utilitarian objective, i.e. O = maxy
∑
i ui(xi, ti, y). Again, since agents
with preference type 0 have constant utility independently of y, we will assume that there is no agent i
with ti = 0.
Theorem 2. Mechanism 1 is an optimal strategy-proof for the Utilitarian objective.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by contradiction. So, assume that there exists an agent i who can
increase his utility by declaring t′i 6= ti. Let y
∗ be the optimal location of the facility when i declares
ti and y
′ 6= y∗ be the location of the facility when he declares t′i. So, by assumption, we have that
ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′).
Firstly, assume that t′i = 0. Then, Mechanism 1 excludes agent i from the computation of y
′. In
addition, since the mechanism uses a declaration-independent tie-breaking rule and y′ 6= y∗, it must be
true that ∑
j 6=i
uj(xj , tj ,y
∗) <
∑
j 6=i
uj(xj , tj,y
′).
If this was not the case, we could increase the value of the objective by choosing y∗ instead. Thus, since
we assumed that ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′), we get that
∑
j uj(xj , tj ,y
∗) <
∑
j uj(xj , tj ,y
′) which
contradicts the assumption that y∗ maximizes the social welfare.
Having established that t′i 6= 0, we consider the following two cases depending on the utilities of
the rest of the agents under y∗ and y′. In what follows we will assume that ti = 1 and t′i = −1; the
arguments for ti = −1 and t′i = 1 are similar.
•
∑
j 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y
∗) <
∑
j 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y
′). Then, as above, we get that y∗ does not maximize the
welfare objective since we have assumed that ui(xi, ti,y
∗) < ui(xi, ti,y′).
•
∑
j 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y
∗) ≥
∑
j 6=i uj(xj , tj ,y
′). Since y∗ 6= y′ and since Mechanism 1 has a declaration-
independent tie-breaking rule, it should be true that∑
j 6=i
uj(xj , tj,y
∗) + ui(xi, t′i,y
∗) <
∑
j 6=i
uj(xj , tj ,y
′) + ui(xi, t′i,y
′).
So, we get that ui(xi, t
′
i,y
∗) < ui(xi, t′i,y
′) and since we have assumed that t′i = −1 we get
that dist(xi,y
∗) < dist(xi,y′). This, in turn means that ui(xi, ti,y∗) > ui(xi, ti,y′) which is a
contradiction.
Hence, we have shown that for any declaration t′i the utility of the agent cannot increase. Thus, the
theorem follows.
3.3 Analysis for the other objectives
Observe that in the analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the only assumptions about the utility functions
of the agents is that they are monotone with respect to the distance between the location of the agent
and the location of the facility. Thus, every agent can have his own type of utility function, completely
different than the types of the other agents.
Recall, for Happiness we have that O = maxymini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗
i
(xi,ti)
where u∗i (xi, ti) = maxy ui(xi, ti,y).
Observe though, u∗i (xi, ti) is a constant, hence the analysis of Section 3.1 applies here as well. So, can
set get the following as a corollary of Theorem 1.
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Corollary 1. Mechanism 1 is an optimal strategy-proof for the Happiness objective.
4 Inapproximability results
In the remainder of the paper, unless specified otherwise, we study the Egalitarian objective. In this
section, we provide inapproximability results for strategy-proof mechanisms for 2-facility games. We
show that the second facility changes dramatically the landscape of strategy-proofness. We prove that
the extension of the optimal mechanism for two facilities, i.e. placing the facilities on the locations that
maximize the objective under the declared preferences of the agents, is not strategy proof even in the set-
ting of a line segment with two agents and known locations. Furthermore, we provide inapproximability
results for strategy-proof mechanisms.
We first prove that there is no 0.851-approximate deterministic strategy proof and then extend it to
strategy-proof in expectation mechanisms.
Theorem 3. There is no α-approximate deterministic strategy proof mechanism for the 2-facility game
with α ≥ 0.851.
Proof. Let us consider the instances I and I ′ depicted in Figure 1. Each white circle corresponds to an
agent. Agent a1 is located on 0 and agent a2 on x >
2ℓ
3 , where the exact value of x will be specified later
in the proof. Without loss of generality we assume that ℓ = 1. Firstly, we will prove that the mechanism
that places the facilities on their optimal locations is not strategy-proof even when the locations of the
agents are known. Then, we will use these instances to derive our inapproximability result.
On instance I agents a1 and a2 have preferences t1 = (−1, 1) and t2 = (0, 1) respectively. It is not
hard to see that the optimal locations for the facilities are y1 = 1 and y2 =
x
2 where each agent gets
utility 2− x2 . The optimal locations of the facilities are depicted by black circles in the figure.
On instance I ′ agent a1 has the same preferences as on instance I while the preferences of agent a2
are t′2 = (−1, 1). The optimal locations for the facilities in this instance are y1 = 1 and y2 = x where
each agent gets utility 2− x.
−11
0
x
2
y2
01
y1
ℓx
(a) Instance I
−11
0
y′2
−11
y′1
ℓx
(b) Instance I′
Figure 1: Example for preferences in {−1, 0, 1}2.
Instances I and I ′ show that the mechanism which places the facilities on the optimal locations is
not strategy-proof. On instance I agent a2 can declare t
′
2 = (−1, 1) and increase his utility from 2 −
x
2
to 2.
Next, we focus the on the inapproximability result for any deterministic mechanism. The high level
idea of the proof is as follows. We assume that we know a strategy-proof mechanism M that achieves
the best possible approximation ratio for the problem. Firstly, we focus on instance I where we show
that M always places the first facility on 1 and we derive the approximation guarantee of M on I as
a function of the location y2 of the second facility. Then, we turn our attention to instance I
′ and we
observe that for the location y′2 of the second facility in this case, it should be true that y
′
2 ≤ y2. Using
this, we consider the two possible cases for the location y1 of facility f1 with respect to x and we derive
bounds on the approximation ratio of M , in each case as a function of x. Then, we optimize on the value
of x and derive the claimed bound.
So, let M be a strategy-proof mechanism that achieves the best possible approximation for the
Egalitarian objective. We first argue that on instance I mechanism M should place facility f1 on
z = 1. If this was not the case, the utility of a1 would strictly increase by the movement of f1 to 1, while
the utility of a2 would remain the same. Hence, the approximation ratio of M would strictly improve
by placing f1 on 1, contradicting the assumption that M achieves the best approximation guarantee.
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Next, suppose that M places facility f2 on y2 ≤ x on instance I. Since M is strategy proof, f2
cannot be placed on any y′2 > y2 on instance I
′. If y′2 > y2, then agent a2 from I could declare
preferences t′2 = (−1, 1) and increase his utility (assuming that x >
2ℓ
3 ). We consider the following two
cases regarding the location y′1 in which M places f1 on I
′:
• y′1 ≥ x. Then, obviously y1 = 1 since otherwise the utility of both agents in I
′ is decreasing
and thus M does not achieve the maximum approximation. So, under M agent a2 on instance
I ′ gets utility at most u′2 = 2 − 2x + y2 while a2 gets utility u
′
1 = 2 − y2 ≥ u
′
2 (since x ≥ y2).
Thus M achieves an approximation of 2−2x+y22−x . Furthermore, on instance I agent a1 gets utility
u1 = 2−y2, since as explained earlier, M places f1 on 1, while a2 gets utility u2 = 2−x+y2 ≥ u1
when y2 ≥
x
2 . Clearly if y2 <
x
2 the utility of a1 gets worse. Thus, the approximation of M on
instance I is 4−2y24−x . Observe that the approximation guarantee of M on I is decreasing with y2
while on I ′ it is increasing with y2. So, if we optimize the approximation guarantee and solve for
y2 we get that y2 =
6x−2x2
8−3x . Thus, if y
′
1 > x, the approximation of M is at most
4− 2 · 6x−2x
2
8−3x
4− x
=
4x2 − 24x+ 32
3x2 − 20x+ 32
(2)
• If M on instance I ′ places f1 on y′1 < x, then observe that there is no location y
′
2 for f2 such that
both agents get utility strictly larger than 1. Thus, in this case M achieves approximation at most
1
2− x
(3)
Observe that the approximation guarantee in (2) increases with x while in (3) it decreases with x. So if
we optimize on the approximation guarantee of M , we have to solve for x the equation −4x3 + 29x2 −
60x + 32 = 0. The unique solution in [0, 1] is x = 13−
√
41
8 . Using this value in (2) and (3) we get
that any deterministic strategy proof mechanism on instances I and I ′ achieves approximation less than
0.851.
The inapproximability bound can be extended to strategy proof in expectation mechanisms.
Theorem 4. There is no α-approximate strategy proof in expectation mechanism for the 2-facility game
with α ≥ 0.851.
Proof. We will use again the instances from Figure 1 to prove the claim setting x = 13−
√
41
8 . Recall that
the optimal utility on instance I is 4−x2 and on I
′ it is 2− x.
So, let M be a strategy-proof in expectation mechanism. Observe that on instance I the mechanism
should place the facility f1 on 1 for the same reason as the one mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3;
every other location for f1 decreases the approximation guarantee of M . Suppose now that M places
f2 on y ∈ [0, 1] according to the probability distribution p(y). Without loss of generality we can assume
that p(y) = 0 for every y > x. This is because the approximation guarantee ofM can increase if we place
the facility on x instead of some y > x. Hence, on instance I under M agent a1 gets utility 1 from f1
and utility
∫ x
0 p(y)(1− y)dy = 1−
∫ x
0 p(y)ydy from facility f2, so u1 = 2−
∫ x
0 p(y)ydy in total. Similarly,
agent a2 gets utility 1 from f1 and utility 1− x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy from facility f2, so u2 = 2− x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
in total. Then, since u2 < u1, the approximation guarantee of M on I is at most
2
4− x
·
(
2−
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
)
(4)
We now consider two cases according to the location in which M places facility f1 on instance I
′.
If M places f1 on y
′
1 ≥ x, then without loss of generality we can assume that f1 is placed on 1 since
every other location decreases the utility of both agents. So suppose that M places f1 on 1 with some
probability.
Furthermore, suppose that M places f2 on y according to the probability distribution π(y) when f1
is placed on 1. Observe that we can assume that M does not place f2 on y > x, since the utility of
both agents could increase by placing it on x instead. Thus, on instance I ′, agent a2 gets utility 1 − x
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from facility f1 and utility 1 − x +
∫ x
0
π(y)ydy from facility f2, so u
′
2 = 2 − 2x +
∫ x
0
π(y)ydy in total.
Similarly, agent a1 gets total utility u
′
1 = 2 −
∫ x
0
π(y)ydy > u′2. Since M is strategy proof it must hold
that
∫ x
0
π(y)ydy ≤
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy. If this was not the case, then agent a2 from instance I could declare
preferences (−1, 1) and increase its utility. As a result the approximation guarantee of M on I ′ is at
most
1
2− x
·
(
2− 2x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
)
(5)
M achieves the best approximation on both instances when the quantities from (4) and (5) are equal.
Hence, if we equalize them and solve for the integral we get that
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy = 6x−2x
2
8−3x and the approxi-
mation guarantee is less than 0.851 on both instances for the chosen x.
If the mechanism places f1 on y
′
1 < x, then on any location for f2 there will be an agent with utility
at most 1 and the approximation guarantee of the mechanism will be at most 12−x < 0.851. Thus, in all
possible cases the approximation of M is upper bounded by 0.851.
5 Deterministic Mechanisms
In this section, we propose deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. An initial approach would be to
consider each facility independently and place it to its optimal location. As we have already proved this
mechanism is strategy-proof by placing each facility independently to its optimal position. However, it
achieves poor approximation if the agents want to be away from the facilities. Consider the case with n
agents located on 0, 2ℓ
n
, 3ℓ
n
, . . . , (n−1)ℓ
n
, ℓ and each having preferences (−1,−1). Observe that the optimal
location for one facility is to be placed on ℓ
n
since this location maximizes the minimum distance between
any agent and the facility. Thus, both facilities will be placed on the same location ℓ
n
. Then the agent
located in 0 has utility 2ℓ
n
, the minimum over all the agents. It is not hard to see that an optimal
solution is to place facility f1 on 0 and facility f2 on ℓ resulting in a utility of ℓ for each agent. Hence,
the mechanism that places the facilities independently to their optimal locations is 2
n
-approximate.
The example above provides evidence that a mechanism with good approximation ratio should not
put both facilities on the same location if there are agents who have preference -1 for both facilities; in
the worst case there is an instance with an agent located in the exact same location where the facilities
are placed and with preferences (−1,−1) resulting in a zero approximation. On the other hand, the
facilities should not be placed far away from each other. This is because, in the worst case again, an
agent might have preference -1 for the facility that is close to his location and preference 1 for the facility
that is far from him.
Using the intuition gained from the discussion above we propose a mechanism for the 2-facility game
that comprises these ideas and places the facilities symmetrically away from the endpoints of the segment.
Mechanism Fixed depicts our approach. It does not use any information from the agents, thus it is de
facto strategy-proof.
Definition 2 (FixedMechanism). Let zf = 1−
√
2
2 . Fixed mechanism sets y1 = zf ·ℓ and y2 = (1−zf)·ℓ.
Theorem 5. Fixed is zf ≃ 0.292-approximate.
Proof. Tables 1 and 2 show the utility the agent located on xi gets under y = (z · ℓ, (1− z) · ℓ) and the
corresponding ratio. Our goal is to find a z ∈ [0, ℓ] that maximizes the minimum ratio. Thus, the optimal
guarantee for Fixed is achieved when z
ℓ
= ℓ−2z2ℓ−2z . If we solve for z, the feasible solution is zf = (1−
√
2
2 )ℓ
and the approximation guarantee follows.
Finally, observe that if the number of facilities to be placed is at least two, then maxy mini ui(xi, ti,y) ≥
maxymini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗
i
(xi,ti)
, since u∗i (xi, ti) ≥ ℓ. Thus, Fixed can be used for both Egalitarian and Happi-
ness objectives and since it does not use any information from the agents, it possesses all the desirable
properties like group strategy proofness and false name proofness.
Theorem 5 shows the sharp contrast between 1-facility and 2-facility games where both locations
and preferences are private. Recall that [10] proved that for 1-facility games there is no deterministic
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ti ui(xi, ti,y) u
∗
i (xi, ti) Ratio
1, 1 ℓ+ 2xi 2ℓ ≥ 1/2
-1, 1 2z · ℓ 2ℓ− xi ≥ z
1, -1 (2− 2z) · ℓ 2ℓ− xi ≥ 1/2
-1, -1 ℓ− 2xi 2ℓ− 2xi ≥
1−2z
2−2z
Table 1: Case analysis when xi ≤ z · ℓ or xi ≥
(1− z) · ℓ.
ti ui(xi, ti,y) u
∗
i (xi, ti) Ratio
1, 1 (1 + 2z) · ℓ 2ℓ ≥ 1/2
-1, 1 2xi 2ℓ− xi ≥
2z
2−z
1, -1 2ℓ− 2xi 2ℓ− xi ≥ 2/3
-1, -1 (1 − 2z) · ℓ 2ℓ− 2xi ≥
1−2z
2−2z
Table 2: Case analysis when z · ℓ < xi < (1 −
z) · ℓ.
strategy-proof mechanism with bounded approximation guarantee. Observe furthermore that Fixed does
not require any information from the agents. Next, we prove that it is optimal when no communication
is allowed.
Theorem 6. Fixed is the optimal deterministic mechanism when no communication is allowed.
Proof. Let M be any deterministic mechanism that places the facilities with no communication. Since
M is deterministic, it places them on the same locations for any instance. So, let y1 · ℓ and y2 · ℓ be
the locations of the first and the second facility respectively. Without loss of generality assume that
0 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 1. We will prove our claim by contradiction. So, for the sake of contradiction assume
that the approximation ratio of M is strictly better than z = (1 −
√
2
2 ). Without loss of generality we
assume that y1 ≤
1
2 . Consider the following two instances. On the first instance there is only one agent
on y1 ·ℓ with preferences (−1,−1). The utility of the agent underM is (y2−y1) ·ℓ. The optimal solution
places both facilities on ℓ and the agent gets utility (2 − 2y1) · ℓ. So, the approximation ratio of M is
y2−y1
2−2y1 . Since the approximation of M is strictly greater than z, we get that
y1 <
y2 − 2z
1− 2z
(6)
Now, consider the instance where there is only one agent on 0 with preferences (−1, 1). Under M , the
agent gets utility (1 + y1 − y2) · ℓ. The optimal solution for this instance places the first facility on ℓ,
the second one on 0, and the agent gets utility 2ℓ. Hence, the approximation guarantee of M on this
instance is 1+y1−y22 . Again, since we assume that the approximation is strictly greater than z, we get
that
y1 > 2z + y2 − 1 (7)
The combination of Equations (6) and (7) dictates that y2 > 3 −
1
2z − 2z > 1 − z. Similarly using
another two instances we can prove that y1 < z. More specifically, we use the instance where there
is only one agent on y2 · ℓ with preferences (−1,−1) and the instance where there is only one agent
on ℓ with preferences (1,−1). Finally, consider again the instance where there is only one agent on 0
with preferences (−1, 1). Recall that the approximation guarantee of the mechanism on this instance is
1+y1−y2
2 . So, since y1 < z and y2 > 1 − z, we get that the approximation guarantee is strictly smaller
than z which is a contradiction. Our claim follows.
5.1 Fixed+ mechanism
In order to describe Fixed+, we need to introduce the following events:
• Lj: Every agent wants facility j below ℓ/2. Formally, for every agent i with xi ≤
ℓ
2 it holds that
tij ∈ {0, 1} and for every agent i with xi >
ℓ
2 it holds that tij ∈ {0,−1}.
• Hj : Every agent wants facility j above ℓ/2. Formally, for every agent i with xi ≤
ℓ
2 it holds that
tij ∈ {0,−1} and for every agent i with xi >
ℓ
2 it holds that tij ∈ {0, 1}.
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Fixed
+ mechanism
Input: Locations x1, . . . , xn and preferences p1, . . . , pn.
Output: Locations y1 and y2.
Set zd =
7
22 ≈ 0.31.
1. If events L1 and L2 occur, then set y1 = y2 = zd · ℓ.
2. Else if events L1 and H2 occur, then set y1 = zd · ℓ and y2 = (1− zd) · ℓ.
3. Else if events H1 and H2 occur, then set y1 = y2 = (1− zd) · ℓ.
4. Else if events H1 and L2 occur, then set y1 = (1− zd) · ℓ and y2 = zd · ℓ.
5. Else set y1 = zd · ℓ and y2 = (1− zd) · ℓ.
Lemma 3. Fixed+ is strategy-proof.
Proof. We will prove that there is no deviation that can yield strictly higher utility for any agent i ∈ N .
Fix an arbitrary declaration for all the agents except agent i. For every j ∈ {1, 2}, let yj , respectively
y′j , denote the location where Fixed
+ places facility j when agent i declares truthfully, respectively
non-truthfully, his preference for facility j. Let us define wij := |y′j − xi| − |yj − xi|. Then, observe
that the difference ∆ between the utility that agent i gets by reporting truthfully and misreporting, can
be written as ∆ = ti1 · wi1 + ti2 · wi2. Hence, there exists a profitable deviation for agent i if and only
if there is a declaration such that ∆ < 0. To prove that such declaration does not exist, we will use
Tables 3 and 4, assuming first that agent i is located on xi ≤
ℓ
2 . This is a concise representation of all
cases that bypasses the repetitive case analysis. Table 3 presents possible preferences of agent i when the
mechanism places the facilities through Step k and it is interpreted as follows. If tij at Step k can be 0
or 1, then we write “+” on the corresponding cell of the table; if tij at Step k can be either 0 or −1, then
we write “-” on the corresponding cell. For example, if the mechanism places the facilities through Step
3, then for agent i it must hold that ti1 ∈ {−1, 0} and ti2 ∈ {−1, 0}. In Table 4, the (k, l)th cell shows
the signs of wi1 and wi2 when the outcome of the mechanism changes from Step k to Step l, where Step
k corresponds to the outcome when agent i truthfully declares his preferences and Step l corresponds
to the outcome of the mechanism when agent i lies. So, the (2, 3)th cell of Table 4 corresponds to the
case where Fixed+ under the true declaration would place the facilities through Step 2, but under the
misreport of agent i would place them through Step 3. In addition, the signs (+, 0) mean that wi1 > 0
and wi2 = 0. So, using this information alongside the information from the agent’s preferences from the
third row of Table 3, we can deduce that ∆ ≥ 0 under this change. If we apply the same reasoning, we
will see that ∆ ≥ 0 for all possible cases when xi ≤
ℓ
2 . Hence, there is no profitable deviation for agent
i, when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
ti1 ti2
Step 1 + +
Step 2 + -
Step 3 - -
Step 4 - +
Step 5 + -
Table 3: Preferences of agent i for
every step of Fixed+, when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Step 1 (0,0) (0,+) (+,+) (+,0) (0,+)
Step 2 (0,-) (0,0) (+,0) (+,-) (0,0)
Step 3 (-,-) (-,0) (0,0) (0,-) (-,0)
Step 4 (-,0) (-,+) (0,+) (0,0) (-,+)
Step 5 (0,-) (0,0) (+,0) (+,-) (0,0)
Table 4: Signs for (wi1, wi2) when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
Similarly when xi >
ℓ
2 , we can use Tables 5 and 6 and see again that ∆ ≥ 0 in every case, thus the
lemma follows.
Theorem 7. Fixed+ is 1− 2zd ≈ 0.366-approximate.
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ti1 ti2
Step 1 - -
Step 2 - +
Step 3 + +
Step 4 + -
Step 5 - +
Table 5: Preferences of agent i for
every step of Fixed+, when xi >
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Step 1 (0,0) (0,+) (+,+) (+,0) (0,+)
Step 2 (0,-) (0,0) (+,0) (+,-) (0,0)
Step 3 (-,-) (-,0) (0,0) (0,-) (-,0)
Step 4 (-,0) (-,+) (0,+) (0,0) (-,+)
Step 5 (0,-) (0,0) (+,0) (+,-) (0,0)
Table 6: Signs for (wi1, wi2) when xi >
ℓ
2 .
Proof. In order to prove our claim, we will focus on the agent that gets the minimum utility under
Fixed
+. We will prove that for every possible combination of his preferences and his location the agent
gets at least 2zd2−zd fraction of the utility he would get under an optimal solution. So, let i be an agent that
gets minimum utility under Fixed+. Without loss of generality, we will assume that he is located below
ℓ
2 . Observe that for the preference combinations (0, 1), (1, 0), (0,−1), (−1, 0) the agent gets utility at
least ℓ, while the maximum utility he can get is trivially bounded by 2ℓ. Hence, if the agent’s preferences
are any of these combinations, then under any location for the facilities the agent gets at least half of
his maximum utility and the mechanism is at least 12 -approximate.
• pi = (1, 1). Observe that if there exists an agent with preferences (1, 1), then Fixed+ will locate
the facilities either through Step 1, or through Step 5. Observe that under any of these steps, agent
i gets utility at least ℓ, while the maximum utility he can get is bounded by 2ℓ. So, the mechanism
is 12 -approximate in any of these steps.
• pi = (1,−1). When there exists an agent below
ℓ
2 with preferences (1,−1), Fixed
+ will place the
facilities either through Step 2, or through Step 5. Observe that both steps place the facilities in
the same way. If we check Tables 1 and 2 we can see that in any case the ratio of the mechanism
is greater than 12 .
• pi = (−1, 1). When there exists an agent below
ℓ
2 with preferences (−1, 1), then Fixed
+ will place
the facilities either through Step 4, or through Step 5. In the worst case scenario when Step 4 is
used, agent i is located at xi =
ℓ
2 − ǫ, for some ǫ > 0. In this case his utility is ui = ℓ+ 2ǫ, so the
ratio of the mechanism is greater than 12 .
The utility of i from Fixed+ in this step is ui = 2zdℓ, when xi ≤ zd and ui = 2xi, when zd < xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
If Step 5 is chosen, there should exist an agent i0 with xi0 ≥
ℓ
2 and ti02 = 1 or with xi0 <
ℓ
2 and
ti02 = −1. The utility of the optimal solution for agent i, gets maximized when agent i0 is located
in xi0 =
ℓ
2 with preferences ti0 = (0, 1). In this case the optimal places f1 on y1 = ℓ and the f2 on
y2 =
ℓ
4 . The utility of i under opt is then ui =
7ℓ
4 , and the approximation in this step is
8zd
7ℓ
(8)
• pi = (−1,−1). When there exists an agent below
ℓ
2 with preferences (−1,−1), then Fixed
+ will
place the facilities either through Step 3, or through Step 5. When Step 3 is used by the mechanism,
agent i gets utility (1 − zd − xi) · 2ℓ while the optimal value is trivially bounded by (1 − xi) · 2ℓ.
Hence the approximation guarantee from this step for xi ≤
ℓ
2 is
1− zd − xi
1− xi
≥ 1− 2zd (9)
When Step 5 is used, the worst case instance for the mechanism is when agent i is located on zd
and there is another agent on ℓ2−ǫ with preferences (1, 0). The optimal mechanism will place f1 on
y1 =
3ℓ+2zd−2ǫ
4 and f2 on y2 = zd. Then, the utility of agent i in the optimal solution is
7ℓ+2zd−2ǫ
4
while the utility he gets under Fixed+ is (1− 2zd) · ℓ. Hence, the approximation ratio of Fixed+ is
4ℓ− 8zd
7ℓ+ 2zd
(10)
12
We first observe from (9) and (10) that 1− 2zd ≤
4−8zd
7+2zd
. Hence, the value of zd for which the approxi-
mation guarantee is maximized can be found if we equalize (8) and (9): 8zd7ℓ = 1− 2zd ⇒ zd =
7
22 ≈ 0.31.
Then the approximation ratio of the mechanism is 411 ≈ 0.36.
Observe that since Fixed+ asks for the exact location of every agent, it requires arbitrarily large
communication; this happens for example when the location xi of an agent i is irrational. However, a
closer look shows that this is not necessary. Fixed+ only needs to know whether an agent is located
below or above ℓ2 . One bit suffices for this piece of information; an agent transmits 0 if he is below
ℓ
2
and 1 if he is above ℓ2 . Furthermore, his preference for each facility requires two bits, so Fixed
+ requires
only five bits per agent. An interesting question is whether there exists a deterministic mechanism that
achieves better approximation when every agent communicates O(1) bits.
6 Randomized mechanisms
In this section, we propose two randomized mechanisms, Random and Random+ that achieve constant
approximation ratio and are universally strategy-proof and strategy-proof in expectation respectively.
Random requires zero communication and Random+ can be implemented using five bits per agent.
Definition 3 (Random mechanism). Random sets y1 = y2 = 0 with probability
1
2 and y1 = y2 = ℓ with
probability 12 .
Theorem 8. Random is universally strategy proof and achieves 12 approximation.
Proof. Firstly, it is easy to see that the mechanism is universally strategy proof since in each case, the
mechanism chooses a fixed location, which is strategy-proof. We will prove that every agent gets utility at
least ℓ2 in expectation from every facility. Suppose that agent i ∈ N is located on xi and has preferences
ti. Let us study the expected utility that the agent gets from facility j. If tij = 1, then the agent’s
utility is ℓ − xi when yj = 0 and xi when yj = ℓ. If tij = −1, then the agent gets utility xi if yj = 0
and ℓ−xi if yj = ℓ. If tij = 0, then the agent gets utility ℓ irrespectively from yj . As a result, the agent
gets utility at least ℓ2 in expectation from each facility. So in total the agent in expectation gets utility
at least ℓ. Since, the maximum utility is trivially bounded by 2ℓ, the theorem follows.
Although Random seems naive, it achieves the best approximation so far, using zero communication
as well.
Theorem 9. Random is the optimal mechanism when no communication is allowed.
Proof. For the purpose of contradiction suppose there is a mechanism M achieving an approximation
strictly higher than 12 . Let p(y1, y2) be the joint probability distribution of the facilities y1 and y2.
Consider now an instance I1 with one agent a1 located at 0 having preferences (1, 1). His utility is then
u1 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p(y1,y2)·(1−y1)+p(y1,y2)·(1−y2)dy1dy2 = 2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p(y1,y2)dy1dy2−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p(y1,y2)(y1+
y2)dy1dy2 = 2 − ω where ω =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 p(y1,y2)(y1 + y2)dy1dy2. In I1 the optimal solution places both
facilities in 0 resulting in a utility of u∗1 = 2. The approximation ratio of M in I1 is then
1−
1
2
· ω (11)
Similarly consider another instance I2 with one agent a2 located at 0 having preferences (−1,−1).
The utility of a2 is then u2 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p(y1,y2)(y1 + y2)dy1dy2 = ω. In I2 the optimal solution places
both facilities in 1 resulting in a utility of u∗2 = 2. Thus the approximation ratio of M in I2 is
1
2
· ω (12)
Combining (11) and (12) we derive that ω = 1 and thus the approximation of M is 12 , a contradiction.
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We should note that Random can be extended for k-facility games, for any k, and achieve 12 approxi-
mation. Furthermore, we use the intuition obtained from it to construct Random+. The first four steps
of Random+ are the same as in Fixed+, so again we will use the events Lj and Hj introduced in the
previous section.
Random
+ mechanism
Input: Locations x1, . . . , xn and preferences p1, . . . , pn.
Output: Locations y1 and y2.
Set zr =
13−√161
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1. If events L1 and L2 occur, then set y1 = y2 = zr · ℓ.
2. Else if events L1 and H2 occur, then set y1 = zr · ℓ and y2 = (1− zr) · ℓ.
3. Else if events H1 and H2 occur, then set y1 = y2 = (1− zr) · ℓ.
4. Else if events H1 and L2 occur, then set y1 = (1− zr) · ℓ and y2 = zrℓ.
5. Else with probability 12 set y1 = y2 = zr · ℓ and with probability
1
2 set y1 = y2 = (1− zr) · ℓ.
Lemma 4. Random+ is strategy proof in expectation.
Proof. Steps 1-4 of Random+ are similar to the steps of Fixed, so any deviation of agent i that changes
the outcome between Steps 1-4 will not result in a better outcome for the agent, as it is shown in Lemma
3. Therefore we only need to examine any deviation to, or from, Step 5.
Deviation to Step 5: Similarly to Lemma 3, let us denote by ∆ = ti1 · wi1 + ti2 · wi2 the difference
between the expected utility of agent i when he reports truthfully and when misreporting and Random+
implements Step 5; here wij :=
1
2 |zrℓ − xi| +
1
2 |(1 − zr)ℓ − xi| − |yj − xi|. Tables 7 and 9 present the
signs of the preferences of agent i when xi ≤
ℓ
2 and xi >
ℓ
2 respectively; recall “+” corresponds to
preferences in {0, 1} and “-” to preferences in {−1, 0}. Each cell of the tables 8 and 10 (for xi ≤
ℓ
2 and
xi >
ℓ
2 respectively) presents the signs of (wi1, wi2) when agent i misreports so that Step 5 is followed
by Random+. It can be easily verified that for all possible combinations we have that ∆ ≥ 0. Thus, any
misrepresentation of the preferences of agent i that changes the outcome of Random+ from Step 1-4 to
Step 5 does not increase the utility of the agent.
ti1 ti2
Step 1 + +
Step 2 + -
Step 3 - -
Step 4 - +
Table 7: Preferences of agent i for Steps 1-4 of
Random
+, when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 5
Step 1 (+,+)
Step 2 (+,-)
Step 3 (-,-)
Step 4 (-,+)
Table 8: Signs for (wi1, wi2) when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
ti1 ti2
Step 1 - -
Step 2 - +
Step 3 + +
Step 4 + -
Table 9: Preferences of agent i for Step 1-4 of
Random
+, when xi >
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 5
Step 1 (-,-)
Step 2 (-,+)
Step 3 (+,+)
Step 4 (+,-)
Table 10: Signs for (wi1, wi2) when xi >
ℓ
2 .
Deviation from Step 5: In order for the outcome of the mechanism to change, the preference of i
must change sign from “+” to “-” or from “-” to “+”. Similarly as above, ∆ = ti1 ·wi1+ ti2 ·wi2 denotes
14
the difference between the expected utility of agent i when he reports truthfully and Step 5 is employed,
and when misreporting. Now, we have that wij := |yj − xi| −
1
2 |zrℓ − xi| −
1
2 |(1 − zr)ℓ − xi|. Each cell
of column c of the tables 11 and 13 presents the only possible signs of (ti1, ti2) of agent i in Step 5 when
he reports his true preference, that can result in the step of column c if he misreports. As an example,
consider the case where ti1 ≤ 0 when xi ≤
ℓ
2 . If i changes his declaration to t
′
i1 ≥ 0 Step 1 cannot be
followed. Again, it can be easily verified that ∆ ≥ 0 in every case, hence there is no profitable deviation
for agent i.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Step 5 (-,-) (-,+) (+,+) (+,-)
Table 11: Signs of (ti1, ti2) when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Step 5 (-,-) (-,+) (+,+) (+,-)
Table 12: Signs of (wi1, wi2) when xi ≤
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Step 5 (+,+) (+,-) (-,-) (-,+)
Table 13: Signs of (ti1, ti2) when xi >
ℓ
2 .
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
True
Lie
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Step 5 (+,+) (+,-) (-,-) (-,+)
Table 14: Signs of (wi1, wi2) when xi >
ℓ
2 .
Theorem 10. Random+ is (12 + zr) ≃ 0.538-approximate.
Proof. To prove our claim, we will focus on the agent that gets the minimum utility under Random+.
We will prove that for every possible combination of his preferences and his location the agent gets a
fraction of 12 + zr of the utility he would get under an optimal solution. So, let i be an agent that gets
minimum utility under Random+. Without loss of generality, we will assume that he is located below ℓ2 .
• pi = (1, 1). If there exists an agent below
ℓ
2 with preferences (1, 1), then Random
+ will place the
facilities through Step 1, or through Step 5. We will consider each case separately. If the facilities
are placed due to Step 1, then the utility of the agent is at least (1 + 2zr)ℓ, while the maximum
utility the agent can get is 2ℓ. Hence, the approximation guarantee of the mechanism in this case is
1
2 + zr. For the case where the facilities are placed due to Step 5, we have to consider the following
subcases. Firstly, if xi ≥ zr, then the expected utility of the agent is (1 + 2zr)ℓ while the optimum
is bounded by 2ℓ, hence the mechanism achieves 12 + zr approximation. If xi < zr, we have to
further consider two cases depending on the reason Step 5 was triggered. The first one is that
there exists an agent i′ with xi′ < ℓ2 that has preference −1 for one of the two facilities. Then,
the optimal value for the objective is upper bounded by 3ℓ2 . Hence, since we assumed that agent
i has the minimum utility under Random+, we get that it achieves 23 approximation in this case.
The second subcase is when there exists an agent i′ with xi′ > ℓ2 that has preference 1 for one of
the two facilities. Then, the optimum is again upper bounded by 3ℓ2 and the mechanism achieves
the claimed approximation ratio.
• pi = (1, 0). Observe that the analysis for the case pi = (0, 1) is symmetric, hence it will be omitted.
When there exists an agent below ℓ2 with preferences (0, 1), then Random
+ will place the facilities
either through Step 1, or through Step 2, or through Step 5. As in the previous case, it is not hard
to see that under any of these steps the utility of agent i is at least (3ℓ2 +zr) · ℓ, while the maximum
utility he can get is bounded by 2ℓ. So, the approximation guarantee follows.
• pi = (1,−1). Observe that the analysis for the case pi = (−1, 1) is symmetric, hence it will be
omitted. When there exists an agent below ℓ2 with preferences (−1, 1), then Random
+ will locate
the facilities either through Step 2, or through Step 5. When the mechanism locates the facilities
through Step 2, then the worst case instance occurs when there is only one agent i on ℓ2 . Then, the
agent gets utility ℓ, while an optimal solution locates the first facility on ℓ2 and the second facility
on 0 yielding utility 3ℓ2 . Thus, the mechanism is
2
3 -approximate. So, for the chosen value of zr,
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the mechanism is (12 + zr)-approximate. If, on the other hand, the mechanism locates the facilities
through Step 5, then the expected utility of agent i is ℓ irrespectively of his location xi. In order to
construct a worst-case instance, it suffices to consider instances with only two agents, since more
agents can only restrict more the set of optimal solutions, which implies that the optimal value
can only decrease. The “loosest” constraint to the optimal that triggers Step 5 too, is when there
is an agent on ℓ2 + ǫ for an arbitrarily small positive ǫ with preferences (1, 0). Then, the worst
case instance for the mechanism, in terms of approximation guarantee, is when xi = 0 and the
optimal utility the agent i gets is bounded by 7ℓ4 ; the first facility is located at
ℓ
4 and the second
one at ℓ. Hence, the mechanism is 47 -approximate. So, for the chosen value of zr, the mechanism
is (12 + zr)-approximate.
• pi = (−1, 0). Observe that the analysis for the case pi = (0,−1) is symmetric, hence it will be
omitted. When there exists an agent below ℓ2 with preferences (−1, 0), then Random
+ will place
the facilities either through Step 3, or through Step 4, or through Step 5. When Step 3, or Step 4,
is used, agent i gets utility 2ℓ− zrℓ−xi, while the optimal utility is bounded by 2ℓ−xi by locating
both facilities on ℓ. So, since xi ≤
ℓ
2 , the approximation of Random
+ is at least 1− zr2 >
1
2 + zr, for
the chosen value of zr. If Step 5 is used, then agent i gets utility at least (
3
2 − zr) · ℓ. Furthermore,
we can trivially bound the optimal utility by 2ℓ, so, for the chosen value of zr we get that Random
+
is (12 + zr)-approximate.
• pi = (−1,−1). When there exists an agent below
ℓ
2 with preferences (−1,−1), then Random
+
will locate the facilities either through Step 3, or through Step 5. When Step 3 is used by the
mechanism, then agent i gets utility (1− zr − xi) · 2ℓ while the optimal value is trivially bounded
by (1−xi) · 2ℓ. Hence, since xi ≤
ℓ
2 , the approximation guarantee of the mechanism is bounded by
1− zr2 >
1
2 + zr. If Step 5 is used, then using similar arguments as in the case where pi = (1,−1),
we can construct the worst case instance for the mechanism by locating an agent with preferences
(1, 0) on ℓ2 − ǫ and by setting xi = zrℓ. Then, under Step 5 agent i gets utility (1 − 2zr) · ℓ and
his utility under the optimal location for the facilities is bounded by (74 − zr) · ℓ; the first facility is
located on (34 + zr) · ℓ and the second one on ℓ. Hence, Random
+ is (1− 2zr)/(
7
4 − zr)-approximate.
It is not hard to verify that for the chosen value of zr we get that (1− 2zr)/(
7
4 − zr) =
1
2 + zr.
Using the same technique as for Fixed+, Random+ can be implemented in a communication-efficient
way where each agent sends only five bits to the planner.
7 Two-preference instances
In this section, we study k-facility games where all the agents have preferences in {0, 1}k, {1,−1}k, or in
{0,−1}k, which we call two-preference instances. The non-existence of optimal deterministic strategy-
proof mechanisms can be extended even on two-preference instances with three agents.
Theorem 11. For any k ≥ 2, there is no optimal deterministic strategy proof mechanism for k-facility
games even on two-preference instances with three agents and known locations.
The proof of the theorem follows from the instances of Figures 2, 3, 4. As in Theorem 3, white circles
correspond to agents and black circles to the optimal locations.
We now show how we can modify Fixed by changing the value of zf and achieve better approximation
guarantees. We denote the mechanisms as Fixed{0,1}, for preferences in {0, 1}k, and Fixed{0,−1}, for
preferences in {−1, 0}k. Furthermore, for k = 2 we derive a new deterministic mechanism termed OPT 2,
for the case where all agents have preferences in {0, 1}2 and their locations are known.
Definition 4. Fixed{0,1} sets y1 = . . . = yk = ℓ2 .
Theorem 12. Fixed{0,1} is 12 -approximate.
Proof. Observe that for every agent i and any facility j it holds that uij(xi, tij ,yj) ≥ ℓ − |xi −
ℓ
2 | ≥
ℓ
2 .
Hence, ui(xi, ti,y) ≥
k·ℓ
2 . Observe, however, that maxy ui(xi, ti,y) ≤ k · ℓ. Hence, agent i under y gets
at least half of his maximum utility.
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Figure 2: Example for preferences in {0, 1}2. The agent located on 0 in the instance I can declare
preferences (1, 1) and increase his utility by moving the facility f2 closer to 0.
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Figure 3: Example for preferences in {−1, 1}2. The agent located on ℓ− ǫ in the instance I can declare
preferences (−1, 1) and increase his utility by moving the facility f2 closer to ℓ− ǫ.
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Figure 4: Example for preferences in {−1, 0}2. The agent located on 0 in the instance I can declare
preferences (−1,−1) and increase his utility by moving the facility f2 away from 0. Observe that for the
Instance I ′ there are two optimal solutions (y1 = 0,y2 = ℓ and y1 = ℓ,y2 = 0). However, this does not
affect the correctness of our example assuming that the mechanism chooses a solution deterministically.
Definition 5. Fixed{0,−1} sets y1 = . . . = y⌈ k
2
⌉ = 0 and y⌊ k
2
⌋ = . . . = yk = ℓ.
Theorem 13. Fixed{0,−1} is ⌊
k
2
⌋
k
-approximate.
Proof. Observe that since ti ∈ {0,−1}k it holds that ui(xi, ti,y) =
∑
j⌈
k
2⌉ · xi + ⌊
k
2⌋ · (ℓ − xi) ≥ ⌊
k
2 ⌋ · ℓ.
Observe though that maxy ui(xi, ti,y) ≤ k · ℓ. Hence, Fixed{0,−1} is at least
⌊ k
2
⌋
k
-approximate.
Definition 6. OPT 2 places each of the two facilities independently on its optimal location.
It is not hard to see that OPT 2 is strategy-proof. This is because we know that when agents’ locations
are known, the mechanism that places one facility on the leftmost optimal location is strategy proof.
Therefore, since the mechanism places each facility independently no agent can increase his utility by
lying.
Theorem 14. OPT 2 is 34 -approximate.
Proof. Before we analyze the approximation guarantee of the mechanism, let us first study the locations
in which the mechanism places the facilities. Since the preferences of each agent are in {0, 1}2, it is not
hard to see that the optimal location for each facility is the median point between the locations of the
leftmost and the rightmost agents that want to be close to the facility.
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that the agent with the minimum utility under OPT2,
denoted by a1, has preferences (1, 1). If ti = (1, 0), then the agent would have utility at least
3
2ℓ since any
other agent who wants to be close to the first facility is located in distance at most ℓ from a1’s location.
The maximum utility the agent can get is 2ℓ, so the mechanism is then 34 -approximate.
Assume that a1 is located on x ≤
ℓ
2 . Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that he is located
on 0 since for any other location the agent would be closer to the facilities and thus his utility would
increase. Then, observe that agent a1, alongside with the rightmost agents, will define the locations of
the facilities. Observe that if the rightmost agent has preferences (1, 1), then OPT2 is optimal. So, we
can assume that the rightmost agent, denoted by ar1, has preferences (0, 1). In the worst case, ar1 will
be located on ℓ, since for every other location the utility of agent a1 will be higher. We have to consider
the two possible preferences for the second rightmost agent with preference 1 for the first facility and
prove that OPT2 achieves the desired approximation. We will use ai to denote this agent and xi to
denote his location.
Firstly, we consider the case where agent ai has preferences (1, 1) and xi ≥
ℓ
2 . The utilities of
the agents for the facilities under the locations (y1,y2), where y2 ≤ xi, are u1 = 2ℓ − y1 − y2, ui =
2ℓ− 2xi+y1+y2 and ur1 = ℓ+y2. OPT
2 will place the facilities to y1 =
xi
2 and y2 =
ℓ
2 and the utility
of agent a1 will be u1 =
3ℓ−xi
2 . Observe that the locations of the facilities that make the utilities of these
three agents equal provide an upper bound on the utility that agent a1 gets under the optimal solution,
since any other solution would yield lower utility for at least one of these agents. If we find the locations
of the facilities that equalize the utilities for the agents we get y1 = 2xi − ℓ and y2 = ℓ − xi and thus
the optimal utility for agent a1 is bounded by 2ℓ− xi. Hence, OPT
2 is α = 3−xi4−2xi ≥
3
4 -approximate.
In the case where xi <
ℓ
2 , it is not difficult to see that agent a1 gets utility at least
5
4ℓ under OPT
2.
Observe that under the optimal solution the utility of the agents is bounded by 32ℓ, since there are no
locations for the facilities where both a1 and ar1 get more than
3
2ℓ. Thus, in this case the mechanism is
5
6 -approximate.
If the preferences of ai are (1, 0), then similar analysis can be applied.
8 Utilitarian and Happiness
In this section we show that Fixed, Fixed{0,1}, Fixed{0,−1}, and Random achieve the same approxima-
tion guarantees for Utilitarian and Happiness objectives as Egalitarian. All mechanisms remain
strategy proof since they do not require any information from the agents. Recall, Utilitarian is
the sum of the utilities of the agents, formally
∑
i ui(xi, ti,y) and Happiness is mini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗
i
(xi,ti)
, where
u∗i (xi, ti) = maxyui(xi, ti,y).
Theorem 15. For Utilitarian and Happiness objectives the following hold. Fixed is zf -approximate.
Fixed
{0,1} is 12 -approximate. Fixed
{0,−1} is ⌊
k
2
⌋
k
-approximate. Random is 12 -approximate.
Proof. In the proofs of Theorems 5, 12, 13, and 10 it is proven that for every agent i holds that
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗
i
(xi,ti)
≥ α, where α is the approximation ratio of the corresponding mechanism. Hence, the claim
for Happiness already follows from those proofs since they capture the definition of Happiness. For
Utilitarian, observe that OPTw = maxy
∑
i ui(xi, ti,y) ≤
∑
i u
∗
i (xi, ti). So, from the proofs of the
aforementioned theorems we get that ui(xi, ti,y) ≥ u∗i (xi, ti) · α for every i. So, if we sum over i we get
that
∑
i ui(xi, ti,y) ≥ α ·
∑
i u
∗
i (xi, ti) ≥ α ·OPTw and the theorem follows.
The observing reader may wonder whether the approximation guarantee of Fixed for Utilitarian
contradicts the result of [36]. Recall, [36] proved that there is no deterministic strategy-proof mechanism
for Utilitarian with approximation ratio better than 2
n
. However, a closer look will reveal that in order
to establish that result, the following assumptions must be made. Firstly, that every agent wants to be
close to the first facility and away from the second facility. Furthermore, they defined the utility of an
agent located on xi to be ui(xi,y) = |xi − y1| − |xi − y2|. This different definition of utility is crucial
for deriving those negative results and this is the reason why our results do not contradict theirs.
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9 Discussion
In this paper, we studied heterogeneous facility locations on the line segment. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first systematic study of this model for the Egalitarian objective. We derived
inapproximability results for strategy-proof mechanisms for Egalitarian even for instances with known
locations and two agents. Furthermore, we derived strategy-proof mechanisms that achieve constant
approximation for Egalitarian, some of which also achieve the same guarantee for Utilitarian and
Happiness objectives.
All of our mechanisms are simple and can be implemented in a communication-efficient way. More
specifically, every mechanism needs zero or five bits of information from every agent. Communication
efficiency is crucial for real life scenarios. Consider the example of the factory and the school discussed
in the introduction. If thousand of citizens live on this street, then our mechanisms require only their
preferences and whether they live on the western part of the street or on the east one and not their full
address saving a huge amount of time to the planner. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that communication complexity is studied for facility location problems. We strongly believe that there
is much to be said about facility location mechanisms and communication complexity. Firstly, it would
be really interesting to understand how limited communication affects the approximation guarantee of
mechanisms. Is there a better randomized mechanism than Random when no communication is allowed?
Are there better mechanism than Fixed+ and Random+ when every agent is allowed to communicate
O(1) bits? Can Fixed+ and Random+ be extended for k ≥ 3 facilities?
Another intriguing avenue of research is to use communication complexity to define “simple” mecha-
nisms. Recently Li [23] defined the obviously strategy proof (OSP) mechanisms to capture the simplicity
of mechanisms. Intuitively, a mechanism is obviously strategy-proof if it remains incentive compatible
even when some of the agents are not fully rational. The formal definition of OSP is quite technical, and
thus we decided not to include it in our paper since it would deviate from its main theme. However, we
strongly believe that some of our mechanisms, if not all of them, should be obviously strategy proof [23].
Fixed and Random do not use any information from the agents. In both Fixed+ and Random+, if an
agent knows the declarations of the rest of the agents, then he can verify that he cannot increase his
utility by misreporting his type using O(1) space. We believe that this kind of mechanisms are de facto
simple and deserve further studying.
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